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Abstract
The most important point in the design of broadcast encryption schemes (BESs) is to obtain a good trade-o! between
the amount of secret information that must be stored by every user and the length of the broadcast message, which are
measured, respectively, by the information rate  and the broadcast information rate B. In this paper, we present a simple
method to combine two given BESs in order to improve the trade-o! between  and B by 6nding BESs with good
information rate  for arbitrarily many di!erent values of the broadcast information rate B. We apply this technique
to threshold (R; T )-BESs and we present a method to obtain, for every rational value 1=R6 B6 1, a (R; T )-BES with
optimal information rate  among all (R; T )-BESs that can be obtained by combining two of the (R; T )-BESs proposed
by Blundo et al. (Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 1190 (1996) 387–400).
c© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with key distribution methods that are suitable for situations in which some groups of users in a
network need to securely and privately communicate among themselves or to receive some information broadcast by a
center through the network. On-line conferences, on-line games, pay TV and video on demand are examples of such
situations.
This communication can be done eCciently by using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The main problem is that
symmetric algorithms require the users in the group to establish a common key before starting the communication.
Usually, an on-line key distribution center is used, which provides a common key to every user in a group just before
these users need to communicate between them. Other solutions are based on the use of an o+-line key distribution center,
which, in a previous phase, distributes some secret information among all users in the network. Every user will use the
information it received to compute the common keys associated with the groups it belongs to. See [13] for an overview
on key distribution systems.
Key predistribution schemes (KPSs) and broadcast encryption schemes (BESs) have been introduced as key distribution
systems that can be used by an o!-line key distribution center.
A key predistribution scheme (KPS), which is called a zero-message broadcast encryption scheme in [4,8], is a method
by which a trusted authority (TA) distributes secret information among a set of users in such a way that every user is able
to compute the keys corresponding to the privileged groups it belongs to. Besides, certain coalitions of users ( forbidden
subsets) outside a privileged group must not be able to 6nd any information on the value of the key associated with
that group. A broadcast encryption scheme (BES) consists of two phases. In the 6rst one, in a similar way as in a
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KPS, some secret information is sent by the TA to every user. In the second phase, the TA broadcasts through an open
channel an encrypted message in such a way that every user in some privileged subset is able to decrypt it. This message
will be used by the users in this group as a common key for secure communication. The users in a forbidden subset cannot
obtain any information on the message that has been sent by the TA. Due to the fact that some public information can
be broadcast through a public channel, less secret information is needed in a BES than in a KPS. We are interested here
in unconditionally secure schemes, that is, schemes whose security does not depend on any computational assumption.
The broadcast encryption schemes we consider in this paper are called one-time broadcast encryption schemes in [9,14]
because just one single broadcast can be securely made by such schemes. This is due to the fact that the broadcast
message can provide to a user in a privileged subset some information about the secret information of the other users in
this subset.
Key predistribution schemes were introduced by Blom [3] and have been also considered in [4,5,8,9,11,14–16]. The
6rst broadcast encryption schemes were proposed by Berkovits [2] and Fiat and Naor [8]. Afterwards, several authors
have studied these schemes [1,4,6,7,9,10,12,14,15]. A good survey on these subjects can be found in [14].
The speci7cation structure  of a KPS or a BES is the family of all pairs (P; F) of subsets of the set of users U
such that every user in P must be able to compute a common key that will remain unknown to the coalition F . A subset
P ⊂ U is a privileged subset of the speci6cation structure  if there exists F ⊂ U such that (P; F)∈. The family of the
privileged subsets of  is denoted by P(). A -KPS and a -BES are, respectively, a key predistribution scheme and a
broadcast encryption scheme with speci6cation structure . The speci6cation structures that have been considered in most
of the previous works about key predistribution and broadcast encryption are in the form =(P;F)={(P; F)∈P×F :
P ∩ F = ∅}, where P;F ⊂ 2U. Threshold speci7cation structures, that is, the speci6cation structures in which P and F
consist of the subsets of U with some given number of users have received considerable attention. If P consists of all
subsets of U with cardinality R and F is formed by the coalitions of at most T users, a (P;F)-KPS (BES) is called
also a (R; T )-KPS (BES). In a (6R; T )-KPS (BES), the family of privileged subsets consists of all subsets of U with
cardinality at most R.
The information rate and the broadcast information rate are the main parameters to measure the eCciency of a broadcast
encryption scheme. The information rate of a BES (or a KPS) is the ratio between the length in bits of the secret message
(or the common key) and the maximum length of the secret information received by the users. In a BES, one has to
also consider the length of the encrypted message to be broadcast by the TA. The ratio between the length of the secret
message and the broadcast message is the broadcast information rate.
In a BES, the information rate and the broadcast information rate cannot be optimized at the same time. In general,
the information rate must decrease in order to increase the broadcast information rate.
An easy way to obtain a broadcast encryption scheme is to distribute a random value ui ∈G, where G is an Abelian
group, to every user i∈U. In order to send a secret message kP ∈G to the users in a privileged subset P, the TA
broadcasts the message mP = (mi)i∈P , where mi = kp + ui. In this case, the information rate is maximum,  = 1, but the
broadcast information rate can be very small, B = 1=(maxP∈P() |P|).
On the other hand, a -BES with maximum broadcast information rate B = 1 can be constructed from any -KPS
such that, for every privileged subset P, the common key uP is an element of an Abelian group G. In that case, the
broadcast message is mP = kP + uP , where uP is the common key that can be computed by the users in P in the -KPS.
The information rate of this -BES coincides with the information rate of the -KPS.
One of the problems that have been considered most in previous works about broadcast encryption is obtaining a good
trade-o! between the information rate and the broadcast information rate. That is, given a speci6cation structure , one
is interested in 6nding a family of -BESs between the two extremal cases above with an optimal relation between
their information rate and broadcast information rate. In other words, a family of -BESs whose information rates verify
∗¡¡ 1 and 1=R¡B¡ 1, where ∗ is the best information rate for a -KPS and R=maxP∈P() |P|, such that it is
not possible to improve simultaneously both information rates in any of these schemes.
Several bounds have been given for the information rate of a KPS [4,9]. The optimality of the (6R; T )-KPSs proposed
in [5,8] is derived from these bounds. Blundo et al. present in [6] a family of (R; T )-BESs obtaining a trade-o! between
the information rate and the broadcast information rate. The BESs in this family have broadcast information rate B = r=R,
r ∈{1; : : : ; R}. These BESs are constructed by using the optimal threshold KPSs given in [5]. Nevertheless, no general
bounds have been found about the relation between the information rate and the broadcast information rate of a BES in
order to prove or disprove the optimality of the BESs in [6].
The general problem that would be interesting to solve is the following: given a speci6cation structure  and a value
of B ∈ (0; 1), to 6nd a -BES with broadcast information rate B and optimal information rate . In other words, to 6nd
a method to determine the values of the function
∗(; B) = sup{ : there exists a -BES with information rates ; B}:
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At the moment, this is still an open problem, but we present in this work some contributions to the solution of this
problem.
The main result of this paper is to obtain (R; T )-BESs with B = h, for any rational value h∈ [1=R; 1]. This will be
attained by applying to the (R; T )-BESs given by Blundo et al. in [7] a simple combination method we present in this
paper. We determine, among all possible combinations, the best one in order to obtain the maximum information rate.
In this way, we obtain a function  = g(B), which provides a lower bound on ∗(; B), for  = (R; T ) and for every
rational value of B ∈ [1=R; 1].
The main concepts about broadcast encryption schemes as well as the notation that will be used are presented in
Section 2. A simple method to combine two given -BESs is given in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to construct a
family of (R; T )-BESs by applying the combination method provided in the previous section to the BESs given by Blundo
et al. in [6].
2. Broadcast encryption schemes
Let  be a speci6cation structure on a set of users U={1; 2; : : : ; N}. In a broadcast encryption scheme with speci6cation
structure , or -BES for short, every user i∈U receives from the TA some secret information ui ∈Ui. Afterwards, for
any privileged subset P ∈P() and for any possible value of a secret message (or secret session key) kP ∈K, the TA
sends by the broadcast channel some information mP ∈MP such that every user i∈P can compute the message kP from
its secret information ui and the broadcast information mP . On the other hand, any coalition F = {j1; : : : ; js} such that
(P; F)∈ must not obtain any information about kP from the secret information (uj1 ; : : : ; ujs) received by the users in F
and the public information mP . That is,
p(KP = kP |Uj1 = uj1 ; : : : ; Ujs = ujs ; MP = mP) = p(KP = kP);
where KP , Uj‘ and MP are, respectively, the random variables corresponding to the secret message kp, the secret information
uj‘ and the broadcast message mp.
A more formal de6nition of broadcast encryption schemes can be given by using the entropy function. See [17] for
an introduction to entropy and its properties. For any subset P = {i1; : : : ; is} ⊂ U, let us consider UP = Ui1 × · · · × Uis .
We can suppose that the TA chooses a value in UU, according to some probability distribution, in order to distribute the
secret information among the users and, afterwards, a value in MP in order to do the broadcast. A -broadcast encryption
scheme must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) The secret message kP must be independent from the secret values distributed in the predistribution phase, that is,
H (KP |UU) = H (KP):
(2) Any participant i∈P in a quali6ed subset P ∈P() is able to compute the common key kP from its secret information
ui and the broadcast message mp:
H (KP |UiMP) = 0:
(3) Any coalition F such that (P; F)∈ can not obtain any information on kP , that is,
H (KP |UFMP) = H (KP):
In this paper, we are going to consider only BESs with uniform probability distributions on K, Ui, UU and MP where
UU ⊂ UU is the set of all possible combinations (ui)16i6N of secret values received by the users in U. In that case, even
joining together the secret information (uj)j∈F of the users in any coalition F , such that (P; F)∈, and the broadcast
message mP , all values of the secret kP ∈K are equiprobable.
The information rate  of a BES is the ratio between the length of the secret message kP and the maximum length of
the secret information received by a user, that is,
=
k
u
; where k = log|K| and u=max
i∈U
log|Ui|:
The broadcast information rate B of a BES is de6ned as the ratio between the length of the secret message kP and the
maximum length of the broadcast message mP:
B =
k
m
; where m= max
P∈P()
log|MP|:
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3. Combination of two dierent -BESs
We present in this section a method, which is based on a simple combination technique, of designing a family of
-BES from two di!erent BESs with the same speci6cation structure .
Let us consider 1 and 2 two -BESs with the following properties:
(1) In the -BES r , where r = 1; 2, every user receives the same amount of secret information in the predistribution
phase. That is, log|Uri |= ur for every user i∈U and for r = 1; 2.
(2) In both BESs 1 and 2, the broadcast messages corresponding to all quali6ed subsets have the same length. It will
be denoted by m1 and m2, respectively.
(3) B1¡B2 and 1¿2, where 1, B1 and 2, B2 are the information rates of the two BESs.
We can design a new -BES combining the previous two -BESs 1 and 2 as follows:
• The secret information of user i∈U will be (u1i ; u2i ), where u1i and u2i are the secret informations of user i∈U
corresponding, respectively, to 1 and 2.
• The encrypted broadcast intended to users in a privileged set P ∈P will be (m1P; m2P), where m1P and m2P are the broadcast
messages in each BES.
• The secret intended to users in a privileged set P ∈P will be (k1P; k2P), where k1P and k2P are the secrets in each BES.
The information rates of this new -BES are easily computed:
3 =
k1 + k2
u1 + u2
; B3 =
k1 + k2
m1 + m2
;
where kr = log|Kr | is the length of the secret message in the BES r . Since
1 =
k1
u1
; B1 =
k1
m1
and
2 =
k2
u2
; B2 =
k2
m2
;
we observe that B1¡B3¡B2 and 1¿3¿2.
Analogously, for any pair of positive integers ; ¿ 0, we can consider a more general combination of the two -BESs
by combining  copies of the BES 1 with  copies of 2. We obtain in this way a -BES with information rates
3 =
k1 + k2
u1 + u2
; B3 =
k1 + k2
m1 + m2
:
The inequalities B1¡B3¡B2 and 1¿3¿2 still hold. We can construct in this way an in6nite family of -BESs
with information rate ∈ (2; 1) and broadcast information rate B ∈ (B1; B2).
4. A new family of (R; T)-BESs
In this section, we apply the combination method in Section 3 to the family of (R; T )-BESs designed by Blundo et al.
in [7].
Theorem 4 in [7] states that, for every integer r = 1; 2; : : : ; R, there exists an (R; T )-BES r such that
k =
(
R− 1
r − 1
)
; u=
(
R+ T − 1
r − 1
)
; m=
(
R
r
)
:
Therefore, we have a family of BESs with information rates
Br =
r
R
and r =
(
R− 1
r − 1
)(
R+ T − 1
r − 1
)−1
:
From these (R; T )-BESs, we obtain lower bounds on ∗(; B) = ∗(R; T; B) for some values of B. Namely,
∗(R; T; r=R)¿
(
R− 1
r − 1
)(
R+ T − 1
r − 1
)−1
=
(
T + R(1− (r=R))
T
)
(R; T ) (1)
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where r = 1; 2 : : : ; R and
(R; T ) =
(
R+ T − 1
R− 1
)−1
is the optimal information rate of a (R; T )-KPS.
Observe that this lower bound can be extended to a continuous function de6ned on the interval [1=R; 1]:
 (x) =
(
T + R(1− x)
T
)
(R; T ) =
y(y − 1) · · · (y − T + 1)
T !
(R; T ); (2)
where y = T + R(1− x).
The next theorems provided a method to construct (R; T )-BESs whose broadcast information rates achieve any rational
value 1=R6 B6 1. In this way, we will obtain lower bounds on ∗(R; T; B) for these values of B.
Theorem 1. Let us consider two (R; T )-BESs, r1 and r2 , where 16 r1¡r26R. Then, for every rational value
B ∈
[ r1
R
;
r2
R
]
;
we can combine r1 and r2 to obtain an (R; T )-BES with broadcast information rate B and information rate
∈ [r2 ; r1 ].
Proof. Let us consider Br1 = k1=m1 and Br2 = k2=m2 and a rational value B ∈ (Br1 ; Br2 ). We want to 6nd positive
integers  and  such that
B =
k1 + k2
m1 + m2
:
Let us take #= =. From the equation B = (#k1 + k2)=(#m1 + m2), we deduce that #= (k2 − m2B)=(m1B − k1). Since
B ∈ (Br1 ; Br2 ), then #¿ 0. Moreover, since m1, m2, k1 and k2 are integer numbers, # is a rational number. If B = r1=R,
we have to take  = 1 and  = 0, and we consider  = 0 and  = 1 if B = r2=R.
For every rational value B ∈ (Br1 ; Br2 ), we denote by (r1; r2; B) the (R; T )-BES with broadcast information rate that,
according to Theorem 1, is obtained by combining r1 and r2 . Next, we are interested in determining, for every rational
value B ∈ (1=R; 1), the values of r1 and r2 that maximize the information rate of the (R; T )-BES (r1; r2; B).
Theorem 2. Let us consider a rational value
B ∈
[
1
R
; 1
]
:
Then, the maximum information rate of the (R; T )-BESs in the form (r1; r2; B) is obtained for r1=RB and r2=r1+1.
Proof. Let us consider r ∈{1; 2 : : : ; R− 2} and two integers ,  with 16 ¡6R− r. Let B be a rational value in
the interval (r=R; (r + )=R]. We are going to prove next that the (R; T )-BES (r; r + ; B) has better information rate
than the (R; T )-BES (r; r + ; B). Let us consider r1 = r, r2 = r +  and r3 = r + , and let
1 =
k1
u1
; B1 =
k1
m1
=
r1
R
and
2 =
k2
u2
; B2 =
k2
m2
=
r2
R
be, respectively, the information rates of the (R; T )-BESs r1 and r2 . Since B ∈ (r1=R; r2=R], there exists #¿ 0 such that
B = (#k1 + k2)=(#m1 +m2). Then, =(#k1 + k2)=(#u1 +u2) is the information rate of (r1; r2; B). The previous equalities
allow to express  as a function of B. Namely,
= f(B) =
(k2m1 − k1m2)B
(u2m1 − u1m2)B − (u2k1 − u1k2) =
a2B
b2B − c2 :
Considering the (R; T )-BESs in the form (r1; r3; B) we obtain, analogously,
= g(B) =
(k3m1 − k1m3)B
(u3m1 − u1m3)B − (u3k1 − u1k3) =
a3B
b3B − c3 :
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Let us observe that a2; b2; c2; a3; b3; c3¿ 0. It is enough to prove that f(x)¿g(x) for all x∈ (r1=R; r2=R]. Let us consider
the function q(x) = f(x)=g(x), derivable in the interval [r1=R; r2=R]. The derivative of this function is
q′(x) =
a2(b2c3 − b3c2)
a3(b2x − c2)2 :
Then q′(x) has constant sign, and therefore q(x) is a monotone function in the above interval. Since q(k1=m1) = 1, we
only need to 6nd a value x0¿k1=m1 such that q(x0)¿ 1, that is, such that f(x0)¿g(x0).
Let us consider x0 = r2=R= k2=m2. Then,
f
( r2
R
)
=
(k2m1 − k1m2)r2
u2m1(r2 − r1) and g
( r2
R
)
=
(k3m1 − k1m3)r2
u3m1(r2 − r1) + u1m3(r3 − r2) :
Now,
f
( r2
R
)
¿g
( r2
R
)
(r3 − r1) u2m2 ¡ (r2 − r1)
u3
m3
+ (r3 − r2) u1m1 : (3)
In our case,
u1 =
(
R+ T − 1
r − 1
)
; u2 =
(
R+ T − 1
r + − 1
)
; u3 =
(
R+ T − 1
r +  − 1;
)
m1 =
(
R
r
)
; m2 =
(
R
r + 
)
; m3 =
(
R
r + 
)
:
Replacing in (3) and simplifying, we obtain the following inequality:
0¡ (R− r) · · · (R− r −  + 1)( − )r + (R+ T − r) · · · (R+ T − r −  + 1)A;
where
A= (r + )(R+ T − r − ) · · · (R+ T − r −  + 1)− (r + )(R− r − ) · · · (R− r −  + 1):
Equivalently,
0¡ (R− r − ) · · · (R− r −  + 1)( − )r + R+ T − r
R− r · · ·
R+ T − r −  + 1
R− r −  + 1 A:
Since (R+ T − k)=(R− k)¿ 1 for every k¿ 0, then it suCces to prove the following inequality
0¡ (R− r − ) · · · (R− r −  + 1)( − )r + A;
which is equivalent to
0¡r( − ) + (r + )R+ T − r − 
R− r −  · · ·
R+ T − r −  + 1
R− r −  + 1 − (r + ):
The previous inequality holds if
06 r( − ) + (r + )− (r + );
which is obviously satis6ed.
Analogous computations show that, for every r ∈{3; : : : ; R}, for every pair of integers ,  with 16 ¡¡r
and for every B ∈ [(r − )=R; r=R), the (R; T )-BES (r − ; r; B) has better information rate than the (R; T )-BES
(r − ; r; B).
Finally, as a consequence of the partial results previously proved, we can conclude that given a rational value
B ∈
[
1
R
; 1
]
;
the maximum information rate of the (R; T )-BESs in the form (r1; r2; B) is obtained for r1 = RB and r2 = r1 +1.
4.1. Examples
We are going to show two graphic examples of the optimal value of , obtained by combining two of the (R; T )-BESs
introduced by Blundo et al. in [7] (which will be called basic (R; T )-BESs from now on), for several values of B.
We represent B in the x-axis and log  in the y axis. Large dots correspond to values of B for which there exists a
basic (R; T )-BES, while small dots correspond to the optimal combination of two basic (R; T )-BESs given by
Theorem 1. The continuous curve is the graph of the function  (x) de6ned in Eq. (2).
In Fig. 1, we consider (R; T ) = (5; 3), and (R; T ) = (7; 12) in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Optimal combination of two basic (5; 3)-BES.
Fig. 2. Optimal combination of two basic (7; 12)-BES.
5. Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we have obtained the following results:
• Given a speci6cation structure  and two -BESs with parameters B1 ¡B2 and 1¿2, we have seen how to obtain
a family of -BES with broadcast information rate in the interval (B1 ; B2) and information rate in the interval (2; 1).
• Given positive integers R and T , we have shown how to obtain a family of di!erent (R; T )-BES with broadcast
information rate B, for any rational value B ∈ [1=R; 1], combining two basic (R; T )-BESs.
• Given positive integers R, T , and a rational value B ∈ [1=R; 1], we have proved that the optimal (R; T )-BESs with
broadcast information rate B designed by combining two basic (R; T )-BESs with broadcast information rates B1 =r1=R
and B2 = r2=R is obtained when r1 = RB and r2 = r1 + 1.
Some important open problems in the design of broadcast encryption schemes appear from the fact that very little is
known about the values of the function ∗(; B), which gives the optimal trade-o! between  and B.
From the BESs proposed by Blundo et al. in [7] for threshold speci6cation structures  = (R; T ), we obtain the lower
bound given in Eq. (1). The 6rst open problem we can consider is to determine whether the inequality in Eq. (1) is
an equality or not. If this equality were true, the (R; T )-BESs proposed by Blundo et al. in [7] would have an optimal
trade-o! between  and B.
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Our construction provide a lower bound on ∗(R; T; B) for any rational value B ∈ [1=R; 1]. This lower bounds are
represented by the small points in Figs. 1 and 2. The second open problem is to determine if these lower bound is tight.
On the other hand, we have seen that the lower bound given in Eq. (1) can be extended in a natural way to continuous
function  (x), which is de6ned by Eq. (2) and whose graph is the continuous curve in the 6gures. The last open problem is
to determine the relationship between this function and the function ∗(R; T; B). We conjecture that ∗(R; T; B)6 (B)
for any B ∈ [1=R; 1]. The optimality of the (R; T )-BESs proposed by Blundo et al. in [7] would be a direct consequence
of this fact.
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